Missouri Law Review
Volume 4
Issue 3 June 1939

Article 1

1939

Legal Protection of Ideas
James C. Logan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
James C. Logan, Legal Protection of Ideas, 4 MO. L. REV. (1939)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Logan: Logan: Legal Protection Ideas

Missouri Law Review
Volume 4

JUNE, 1939

Number 3

LEGAL PROTECTION OF IDEAS
JAmSm C. LO:AN*

Modern business methods force the jurist to a reconsideration of an
old problem-property in ideas. Our approach might itself be resolved
into a maze of abstractions except for the practical importance this question assumes in industry. The business man complains that a competitor
has copied his scheme for doing business. The advertising agency finds
that its unique advertising plan has been appropriated. The scenario
writer discovers that his plot and scenes have been imitated. And a hapless inventor learns that a manufacturer has taken his idea for a new
mechanism. Each believes himself aggrieved and each vociferously clamors
for redress. Such business practices may justly be condemned on moral
considerations, but are they actionable in the courts? The frequency of
these cases--caused perhaps by the evanescent nature of ideas and the
consequent difficulty in detecting their larceny-demands an answer to
the plea of these injured parties.
". .. we must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the
service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and
the reward of their ingenuity and labor; the other, that the world may
not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be re.
tarded. ' Thus did Lord Mlansfield indicate the basis for what must be
our solution to the problem of ideas, a problem arising in the fields of copyright, patents, literary property, and unfair competition.

*Attorney, Kansas City. A.B., 1933, Baker University; LL.B., 1936, Washington University.
1. Sayre v. Moore, 1 East 361 (K. B. 1785).

(239)
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The early cases, for the most part, involved drama and lectures, and
undoubtedly the law of ideas was influenced by questions arising from these
particular circumstances. New questions now must be answered which
often involve attractive financial stakes, and they are being artificially but
not improperly settled by rules of a former era. This is but another instance indicating the versatility of our system of jurisprudence. Our consideration here will constitute an effort to explore the methods, if any, by
which an originator of ideas may protect himself.

I.

ABSTRACT IDEAS AS PROPERTY

A. At Common Law
The courts have never been willing to extend protection to the author
of abstract ideas, in the absence of some confidential relationship existing
between the parties. Unless the idea is connected with some definite and
concrete scheme for carrying it out, it is clearly beyond the protective cloak
of the law. The reason for this attitude on the part of the courts is clear,
its root lying in considerations of public policy. Until an author has
reduced his idea to a concrete form, he has not performed such a service
to the public as to merit recognition or reward in the form of legal protection. Until the idea is put into a usable state, its author may claim no
rights therein, for otherwise the courts would deprive the world of finished
improvements and would retard the progress of the arts. Such would
constitute the second of the two extreme points of view of which Lord
Mansfield was so rightly apprehensive.
The conclusion having been reached, therefore, in advance, on grounds
of policy, that abstractions should not be protected, the question arises as to
how the courts reached that result in legal theory. The story is an interesting one. On several occasions the courts compared ideas to ferao
naturae,property rights in which are dependent on possession; and it was,
therefore, concluded that disclosure of ideas operated in the same way
as permitting the escape of wild animals, in extinguishing all rights of
the purported owner. Other courts pointed out that ideas were similar
to negotiable instruments or legal tender, in that title passes by delivery
(by disclosure). It has further been noted that ideas often depend for their
efficacy upon the voluntary action of persons beyond the control of the
author and hence are too inchoate to be capable of dominion. Another court
observed that they have no "ear marks" or "distinguishing indicia" which
are essential to all property. Finally, it has been held that ideas are part
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss3/1
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of the public domain, occupying the same category as the air we breathe
or the water of the ocean and, therefore, are not susceptible of private
ownership.
By these various devices the courts have all reached the conclusion that
ideas in themselves are not property and in this way effectuate their determination to extend no protection. Sometimes, however, in so doing,
the courts have overlooked the basic reason of policy behind the doctrine
of ideas and, even where the facts have presented situations in which the
idea was clothed in a fairly concrete form, no protection was granted.
An early case in which an author of ideas claimed property rights was
Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society.2 Plaintiff alleged that he had
written defendant a letter suggesting an advertising system to be used for
selling insurance. The letter requested that its contents be considered
confidential. A requirement was that the writer become an officer of the
company on a salary position in event the plan was accepted. The letter
outlined a vague plan for selling of insurance with the suggestions that
advertising be reduced, commercial agency reports be used as guides to
prospects, $1,000.00 be spent in mailing a letter "worded just right, not
too long, mailed from the right place, from a party having just the right
title, and written on a letter-head arranged in just the proper way," personal contact be made by agents with recipients of letters, a friendship be
built up between prospect and the company, men of dignity and character be used, and when the applicant was not secured on the first interview
succeeding attempts be made every year. This plan was not copyrighted
or patented and it clearly appeared that the details were to be worked out
later. Nevertheless, plaintiff claimed to be the owner of property rights
therein and contended that defendant had no right to use the plan without
paying for it. Counsel for the plaintiff contended that "we possess as
absolute a right over our thoughts as we have over the brain cells whose
rhythm gives to the sensational impulses the thought form, and whether
we use the thought form to mould words with our mouth, or bricks with
our hands, the product is equally our property."
The court in overruling this contention pointed out that, if it were
sound, there would be no occasion for the existence of either the copyright
or the patent laws, and said:
"It is difficult to conceive how a claim to a mere idea or
scheme, unconnected with particular physical devices for carry-

2.

52 Hun 161, 5 N. Y. Supp. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
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ing out that idea, can be made the subject-matter of property. So
long as the originator or possessor of the naked idea retains it,
whether, germinating under the laws of metaphysics, it be regarded as Platonic or Cartesian in its make-up, it is his property,8
but it ceases to be his own when he permits it to pass from him."
The court approved the suggestion made by counsel for defendants,
comparing ideas with commercial paper, saying that "as the ingenuous
counsel for the defendant say, it is like commercial paper,-it passes by
delivery. ' 4
The court then compared ideas to ferae naturae:
"Ideas of this sort, in their relation to property, may be
likened to the interest which a person may obtain in bees and
birds, and fish in running streams, which are conspicuous instances ferae naturae. If the claimant keeps them on his own
premises, they become his qualified property, and absolutely his
so long as they do not escape; but if he permits them to go he cannot follow them. "1
The New York Court of Appeals6 affirmed this decision by pointing out
that the plaintiff communicated his system to defendant to induce it to
employ him and thus used it "as an attractive adjunct to his own selfcommendation," but that he was unable to induce the defendant to adopt
both the system and the writer and there could be no recourse against a
defendant who had merely acted upon the hint plaintiff gave to it and
found it profitable to do so.
Another case in which the same point was raised was Burnell V.
Chown,7 in which complainant alleged that he had conceived and put into
operation a scheme for collecting, classifying and putting in convenient
form information in respect to the financial standing of businessmen in
towns or counties, with a key thereto; and that the scheme being intended
for the use of businessmen, had wrongfully been appropriated by defendant without plaintiff's consent. Although a definite key system had been
supplied, the court held that it constituted merely an idea which neither
the common law or copyright law could protect. The question was not
discussed at length.
In Maxwell v. Goodwin,8 suit was brought for piracy of a play and a
verdict in favor of plaintiff for $10,000.00 was reversed, for the reason

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 165, 5 N. Y. Supp. at 132.
Ibid.
Ibid.

132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E. 506 (1892).

69 Fed. 993 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1895).
93 Fed. 665 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1899).
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that the court found that the lines had not been appropriated but merely
the ideas, there being a similarity in general features since both plays had
as their theme "Congressional life in Washington." The court held "that
there is no inherent property right in ideas, sentiments, or creations of the
imagination expressed by an author, apart either from the manuscript in
which they are contained, or 'the concrete form which he has given them,
and the language in which he has clothed them.' " The court stated that
he had read the two plays and compared them, but could find "no copying
or imitation in plot, scene, dialogue, sentiment, characters, or dramatic
situations, and no similarity, aside from the general features and subjects. ... "
In Haskins v. Ryan,9 plaintiff alleged that he had crystallized and
formulated a plan which he had laid before defendant by which the white
lead industries in the United States not already a part of the National Lead
Company could be combined into one corporation; and that he had either
purchased options thereon or had opened negotiations for their purchase.
An elaborate prospectus had been prepared containing data concerning the
white lead industry with respect to production, principal consumers and
the desirability of consolidation. An outline of the procedure to be used
in putting the plan into effect was set out and the prospectus concluded
with a recapitulation concerning the organization of the new company and
the issuance of stock. Nevertheless, the court regarded the whole scheme
as merely an idea and held that it could not be protected, sustaining a demurrer to a complaint for wrongful appropriation. The court first discussed the nature of property, pointing out that there is no property in a
thing over which there cannot be some sort of dominion and that it could
not be said that an idea was susceptible to dominion. The court pointed
out that in the case before it the idea involved the voluntary action and
operation of many individuals beyond the control of complainant, saying:
"The means of carrying out the plan, of giving effect to the
idea, lay, therefore, beyond his control. It was an idea depending
for its realization upon the concurring minds of many individuals,
each of them unbound by contract and free to act as he chose. Such
a project or idea can scarcely be called 'property.' It lacks that
dominium, that capability of being applied by its originator to
his own use, which is the essential characteristic of property. It
differs fundamentally from the secret process or patented inven-

9.

71 N. J. Eq. 575, 64 AtI. 436 (Ch. 1906).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1939], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

tion which is capable of material embodiment at the will of the
inventor alone. It is worthless unless others agree to give it life."10
The court quoted from Lord Brougham in Jefferys v. Boosey, as follows .
"Vol.t irrevocable verbum, whether borne on the wings of the
wind or the press, and the supposed owner loses all control over
them. . . . He has produced the thought and given it utterance, and, eo instante, it escapes his grasp-."
The court further quoted from Justice Yates in his dissenting opinion

in Millar v. Taylor :12
"Now where are the indicia or distinguishingmarks of ideas?
What distinguishing marks can a man fix upon a set of intellectual
ideas, so as to call himself the proprietor of them ? They have no
ear-marks upon them.
Two cases have arisen in which it was alleged that there had been a
wrongful appropriation of the "Morris Plan," described as "a unique
plan of lending to poor people money, returnable in weekly installments
and reinvesting these weekly installments." In Stein v. Morris18 it was
alleged that plaintiff had written defendant a letter containing an elaborate
system of figures to be used in making loans. Plaintiff had organized a
corporation in Virginia for the purpose of putting this plan into operation
and it had thereafter been appropriated by defendant. The court held that
this was a mere idea and denied recovery, saying that plaintiff could not
put such an idea into operation "without it at once escaping his own grasp
' 14
and becoming the property of mankind.
In Universal Savings Corp. v. Morris Plan Co.,10 the court dismissed a
bill in equity for an accounting and for an injunction to prevent defendant
from using the plan, saying that there could be no property right in an
idea for conducting business "without physical means or devices for carrying it out."
The New York Court of Appeals again had occasion to consider the
general question in Fendler v. Morosco,'6 in which suit was brought for the

10. Id. at 579, 64 AtI. at 438.

11. 4 H. L. Cas. 815, 965 (1854).
12. 4 Burr. 2303, 2366 (K. B. 1769).
13. 120 Va. 390, 91 S. E. 177 (1917).
14. Id. at 394, 91 S. E. at 179.

15. 234 Fed. 382 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
16. 253 N. Y. 281, 171 N. E. 56 (1930).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss3/1
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appropriation of plaintiff's drama, which at the time of the appropriation
had been unpublished and uncopyrighted. Plaintiff contended that she
had submitted the play to defendant, that he had refused to accept it, but
later used it in writing another play. In affirming the dismissal of the
complaint, the court of appeals pointed out that, although the scene of both
plays was laid in Hawaii and in both an American fell in love with a
native girl, and although both plays contained an attractive and novel
local color by presenting Hawaiian customs, religious rites, songs and
dances, it was possible that the plays might have been conceived independently. The court said:
"There may be literary property in a particular combination
of ideas or in the form in which ideas are embodied. There can be
none in the ideas.
" 'Ideas, it has always been admitted, even by the Stationers'
Company, are free as air. If you happen to have any, you fling
them into the common stock, and ought to be well content to see
your poorer brethren thriving upon them.' 'Copyrights in Books,'
by Augustine Birrell, page 167."'
In Moore v. Ford Motor Co.,"s plaintiff alleged that he had written a
letter to the Ford Motor Company submitting a sales plan for the selling
of cars through weekly deposits in banks, by which the Ford Company
was to pay 10% interest on such deposits. This plan was elaborately
discussed in the letter, but the details were not worked out, and the court
in dismissing the complaint pointed out that "it is the form, sequence, and
manner in which the composition expresses the idea which is secured to
the author, not the idea."
In Lieddeclce v. Chevrolet Motor Co.,' 9 plaintiff brought an action
on an alleged implied contract on the part of defendant to pay the reasonable value of an idea and suggestion furnished it by plaintiff. It was alleged
that plaintiff wrote defendant a letter suggesting that the latter experiment
with the shifting units of the Chevrolet motor car so that the body would
not sag on one side and permit the fender to rub on the tire. No designs
or drawings were submitted with the letter, and in sustaining a demurrer
to the complaint the court pointed out that whatever interest plaintiff
had in his idea became common property upon its 'disclosure.

17. Id. at 287, 171 N. E. at 58.
18. 28 F. (2d) 529 (S. D. N. Y. 1928), aff'd, 43 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A.
2d, 1930).
19. 70 F. (2d) 345 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
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In Midwest Recordings, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Co.,20 arising
in the United States District Court for Minnesota, a suit was brought for
wrongful appropriation of an advertising idea submitted for approval by
plaintiff to defendant's agent. The plan was to broadcast three programs
a week, which should consist of a playlet, music and commercial announcements all in connection with the publication of an amateur newspaper
of a small town variety, and the radio audiences were to be invited to become reporters of the newspaper by sending in contributions for publication. The newspaper was to be distributed at retail outlets of defendant.
Plaintiff admitted that "there was nothing new in the idea," but contended that "the various steps as outlined in his scheme taken together
were novel in advertising through radio broadcasting." In directing a
verdict for defendants, the court held that there could be no property right
in an abstraet idea for "an abstract idea once published becomes common
property subject to the use of all persons."
Thus it is seen that by various devices of legal theory the courts have
all reached the conclusion that there is no property in abstract ideas.
B. Protection by Patent
Abstract ideas do not fall within the cloak of patent protection. "Any
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvements thereof" may be patented.21 An idea
22
does not come within any of these categories.
(1) "any new and useful art"
An idea does not constitute an art. Thus it was held that an idea for
a joint or consolidated tariff index that would show all the tariffs in force
on a number of railroads, was unprotected, because "what gives the
breath of life to such a patent is not the system or the good advice contained in the disclosure, but the means shown and deseibed. "23 Ideas to

20. (1938, unreported).
21. 29 STAT. 692 (1897), 35 U. S. C. § 31 (1929): a patent may also be
obtained by one "who has invented, or discovered and asexually reproduced any
distinct and new variety of plant other than a tuberpropagated plant".
22. 48 C. J. 21: "An art or process is not a mere abstraction. An art or
process includes only such operations as are capable of producing a tangible
product or of accomplishing a change in the character or quality of some material object." 48 C. J. 28: "The mere existence of an intellectual notion that a
certain thing could be done, and, if done, might be of practical utility, doet
not furnish a basis for a patent."
23. Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 F. (2d) 725, 726 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss3/1
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be used later in the discovery of chemical processes24 and scientific theories 25
are not patentable. A method of cash registering and coin checking is likewise held not to constitute a patentable art or process, for, "no mere
abstraction, no idea, however brilliant, can be the subject of a patent.
.

Neither is a system of code messages an art.2

26

7

Nor is an idea for

a method of distributing and regulating alternating electric currents by
secondary generators susceptible of patent protection. 2 In one of the early
cases it was held that there could be no infringement of a patent covering
a mode of collecting combustible gases ordinarily escaping from a gas
29

furnace.

24. Monsanto Chemical Works v. Jaeger, 31 F. (2d) 188 (W. D. Pa.
1929).

25. Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 47, 53 (D. Del.

1934).
26. Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 Fed. 467 (C. C. A.
2d, 1908).
27. Berardini v. Tocci, 190 Fed. 329, 332 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911), in
which the court said: "'In the sense of the patent law an art is not a mere
abstraction. A system of transacting business, disconnected from the means
for carrying out the system, is not, within the most liberal interpretation of. the
term, an art. Advice is not patentable.'"
28. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Saranac Lake Electric Co., 108
Fed. 221, 223 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1901), in which the court said: "What he
did can hardly be called an abandoned experiment for there was no experiment
to abandon; it was only a tentative suggestion, an ingenious theory, a clever

idea which is altogether too nebulous a foundation upon which to rest a patent

which seeks to levy an immense tribute from the art and which was not thought
of until five years afterwards. .

.

. In

contemplation of law an invention

does not exist until the inventor's theories and ideas have been reduced to practical form. It cannot be predicated of mere speculation and conjecture; it must
be based upon something ascertained, something definite and certain."
29. Detmold v. Reeves, 7 Fed. Cas. No. 3831, 547, 549 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1851).
The opinion shows such profound consideration on the part of the
judge that we quote profusely from it:
. "The abstract must have been resolved into the concrete. The patent must
be for a thing-not for an idea merely.
"The limitation, it may be said, denies to some of the more important products of mind what it concedes to others of lower grade. But it is not the less
true on that account. Men may be enriched, or made happy, by physical, as well
as by moral or political truths, which, nevertheless, go without reward for
their authors. He who devised the art of multiplication could not restrain
others from using it after him, without paying him for a license. The miner
who first found out that the deeper veins were the richer in metal, could not
compel his neighbor to continue digging near the surface.
"The more comprehensive truths of all philosophy, whatever specific name
we give them, can not be specially appropriated by anyone. They are almost
elements of our being. We have not reasoned them out, perhaps, and may be

even unconscious of their action; yet they are about us, and within us, enter-

ing into and influencing our habitual thoughts, and pursuits, and modes of lifecontributing to our safety and happiness. And they belong to us as effectively
as any of the gifts of Heaven. If we could search the laws of nature, they
would be, like water and the air, the common property of mankind; and those
theories of the learned which we dignify with this title, partake, just so far as
they are true, of the same universally diffused ownership. It is their application

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
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(2) "machine"
Neither does an idea constitute a machine. It has been held that an
idea for a machine is not patentable, although the machine, if fully developed, would have been.30 Where the idea is merely for the working out
of mechanical skill, it is held that there may be no patent protection.8 1 An
idea for a machine to measure fabric and compute prices was held unprotected;22 Likewise it was held that a mechanical idea for handling the
large number of passengers who patronize the public vehicles provided for
rapid transit in large cities was not protected by patent.8
(3) "manufacture"
An idea does not constitute a manufacture within the meaning of the
statute. Thus an idea for a phonograph disc 34 was held not a manufacture,
as well as an idea for a vacuum pressure frame,35 or a power-life implement.3 6
(4) "composition of matter"
It could scarcely be contended that an idea would constitute a composition of matter, and, in Corrington v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,"7 the
court held that an idea for a pressure brake fluid could not be protected by
a patent, saying: "He may have had a mental conception thereof, but, so
far as the testimony shows, there was no tangible reduction to practice,
no practical illustration .
"

to practical use which brings them within the domain of individuals; and it is
the novelty of such an application that constitutes it the proper subject of a

patent. But the contract of the public is not with him who has discovered,
but with him who also makes his discovery usefully known."
30. Clark Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U. S. 481 (1891).
31. Tropic-Aire, Inc., v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 44 F. (2d) 580 (C. C. A. 8th,
1930), which involved an idea for a heating system. The court said:
new thoughts which merely involve the working out of mechanical skill to produce a result are not patentable." See also A. R. 0. Equipment Corp. v. Herring-Wissler Co., 84 F. (2d) 619, 622 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936), which involved a
patent for a lubricant gun.
32. Measuregraph Co. v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 29 F. (2d) 263,
275 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
33. Fowler v. City of New York, 121 Fed. 747, 748 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903),
in which the court said: "If a scheme for handling the traveling public in congested districts can, for patent purposes, be regarded as a machine, it is by
no means easy to perceive why a new plan for reorganizing the police force,
or mobilizing the army or manipulating the guests at crowded public functions,
may not also be aptly described as a machine and patented as such."
34. Dyer v. Sound Studios of New York, Inc., 85 F. (2d) 431 (C. C. A.
3d, 1936).
35. Directoplate Corp. v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 51 F. (2d) 199
(C. C. A. 6th, 1931).
36. Killefer ffg. Co. v. Dinuba Associates, Ltd., 67 F. (2d) 362 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1933).
37. 178 Fed. 711, 715 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss3/1
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(5) "or any new and useful improvements thereof"
An idea for a useful improvement of a machine, manufacture, art,
or composition of matter is not patentable. In Miner v. T. H. Symington
Co.,38 the United States Supreme Court held that a patent covering an
improvement in draft rigging for railroad cars failed to protect the inventor for the reason that his idea had never been reduced to concrete form,
the court saying that there was disclosed at most "a mental conception
in process of development which occasionally was outlined on scraps of
paper and then committed to the waste basket and was roughly worked
into a wooden model four or five inches long with a pen knife." The
Supreme Court has also held that an idea for an improvement in the
machinery for the making of hat bodies could not be protected, because
no authority could be found "to grant a patent for a 'principle' or a
'mode of operation,' or an idea, or any other abstraction.' 39 Neither is an
idea for an improvement in tungsten and methods of making the same into
filaments of incandescent lamps subject to patent protection. 40
C. Protectionby Copyright
Various reasons have been assigned by the courts to their consistent
refusal to grant copyright protection to ideas. It is said that the purpose
of the Act was to protect only the concrete expression of ideas in manuscript form. 1 It is also pointed out by the courts that ideas generally resemble an art, process or system rather than anything contemplated by the

38. 250 U. S. 383 (1919).
39. Burr v. Duryee, 1 Wall. 531, 570 (U. S. 1863).
40. General Electric Co. v. DeForest Radio Co., 17 F. (2d) 90 (D. Del.
1927). In this case it was contended that a mental conception was complete
when there was a definite idea of the thing itself, even without a knowledge
on the part of anyone as to how to make it, and that when fully disclosed the
idea had the effect in law of denying to anyone else the right to perfect patent.
The court approved the following quotation from Robinson on Patents, § 77:
"Every invention contains two elements: (1) An idea conceived by the inventor; (2) An application of that idea to the protection of a practical result. Neither of these elements is alone sufficient."
41.

35 STAT. 1075, 1088 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 1 (1927), provides protection

by copyright against the following acts: to print, reprint, publish, copy, translate, deliver, perform and vend. See Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U. S. 674, 675
(1878) (copyright of maps); White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209
U. S.1, 17 (1907) (copyrighted musical composition); Kalem Co. v. Harper
Brothers, 222 U. S.55, 63 (1911) (copyrighted book); Burk v. Johnson, 146
Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906) (a copyrighted system); Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F. (2d) 131, 137 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932) (copyrighted adver-

tising); Downes v. Culbertson, 153 Misc. 14, 275 N. Y. Supp. 233, 242 (Sup.
Ct. 1934) (bridge system).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
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Copyright Act, and therefore, the author of an idea must rely on the
patent statutes for protection, if there is any protection.41 Other courts
have relied upon the doctrine of fair use, permitting the appropriation of a
3
mere idea from even a completed literary work.4
Two other reasons have been urged by the courts, and as these reasons
are applicable to common law protection of literary property, and have
been used by common law cases, the decisions will be noted in greater detail.
(1) Ideas as Common Property
Ideas, when disclosed, become part of the public domain and are not
susceptible of private appropriation. In this way ideas are similar to air,
which is the common property of all. A leading case is Taylor v. Comm'r
of Interna. RevenUe,44 decided by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. Petitioner had devised a plan for newspaper advertising which
he termed the "Taylor Plan." He contended that this plan constituted an
exhaustible asset within the meaning of the Revenue Act, which provided
for a reasonable allowance for the wear, tear and exhaustion of property
used in the taxpayer's course of business. The plan had been copyrighted,
but the court nevertheless held that it was not property, saying, "What
was the 'Taylor Plan'? Taylor had an idea, theory, or system in his head.
It could not be subject to ownership in a legal sense any more than the
multiplication table.""4
In Park v. Warner Bros.,46 a decree was granted dismissing the bill
of complaint for infringement of a copyrighted song, the only similarity
being in the central idea. The court pointed out that "neither ideas nor

42.

Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99, 101 (1879)

(a bookkeeping system);

Griggs v. Perrin, 49 Fed. 15 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1892) (shorthand book); Pel-

legrini v. Allegrini, 2 F. (2d) 610, 612 (E. D. Pa. 1924) (statuette); Brief English Systems, Inc. v. Owen, 48 F. (2d) 555, 556 (C. C. A. 2d-, 1931) (shorthand
system); Affiliated Enterprises, Inc. v. Gantz, 86 F. (2d) 597, 598 (C. C. A.
10th, 1936) (bank night plan).
43. 13 C. J. 1108, 1126; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F. (2d) 690, 691 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1936) (plot for drama); Nutt v. National Institute, Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F. (2d) 236, 239 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) (memory lectures); Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F. (2d) 694 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929) (consolidated
freight tariff index); Rush v. Oursler, 39 F. (2d) 468 (S. D. N. Y. 1930);
Kaeser & Blair, Inc. v. Merchants' Ass'n, 64 F. (2d) 575, 577 (C. C. A. 6th,
1933) (copyrights catalog); Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F. Supp. 73 (S. D. N. Y.
1932) (copyrighted play); Echevarria v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F.
Supp. 632, 635 (S. D. Cal. 1935) (motion picture).
44. 51 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 689 (1932).

45. Id. at 917.
46. 8 F. Supp. 37 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss3/1
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phrases nor ordinary English idioms or words are protected by copyright.
They are all in the public domain."
Most of the cases rest on the theory that ideas are common property.
Thus it was held that O'Neill's drama "Strange Interlude" was not an
infringement of a prior work, for at most, only the idea had been taken,
and in order to be a literary larcenist, an author "must do more than
filch ideas." '47 The idea of a romance between a Jewish boy and an Irish
girl was held not subject to the protection afforded by a copyright of the
drama "Abie's Irish Rose," for the court pointed out that "emotions,
like mere ideas, are not subject to pre-emption; they are common prop-

erty.

'48

Likewise, it was held that the play "Death Takes a Holiday" was not
an infringement of a prior copyrighted drama, for the only similarity lay
in their common ideas and sentiments "which have long been common
property for authors and playwrights to embellish." 49
(2) Public Policy
It would be against public policy to grant a monopoly of ideas, for
the reason that abstractions would be withdrawn from public use, thereby
discouraging authors and inventors from exploiting their ideas for the
common good and restricting the opportunity for progress. This situation
is aptly illustrated in the field of drama where it is said there are only a
dozen basic plots, and if the law were to extend its protection to ideas, the
complete supply of plots would soon be exhausted, making it impossible for
an author to write a play without paying royalty to the originator of the
basic plot.50
The whole object of the copyright laws was to promote public policy
by granting protection to authors of concrete works, thereby encouraging
them to develop their ideas into usable form. This purpose would be

47. Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F. (2d) 603, 607 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
48. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F. (2d) 145 (S. D. N. Y.
1929), cert. denied, 51 Sup. Ct. 216 (1930).
49. Wiren v. Shubert Theatre Corp., 5 F., Supp. 358, 363 (S. D. N. Y.
1933). See also Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S.82, 86 (1899); London v. Biograph
Co., 231 Fed. 696, 698 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916); Ornstein v. Paramount Productions,
Inc., 9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D. N. Y. 1935).
50. Eichel v. Marcin, 241 Fed. 404, 408 (S.D. N. Y. 1913): "If an author, by originating a new arrangement and form of expression of certain ideas
or conceptions, could withdraw these ideas or conceptions from the stock of materials to be used by other authors, each copyright would narrow the field
thought open for development and exploitation, and science, poetry, narrative,
and dramatic fiction and other branches of literature would be hindered by
copyright, instead of being promoted."
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
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frustrated if the courts were to hold that the copyright laws protected
ideas. The result would be a fraud on the public, by depriving it of many
useful improvements and literary productions. 1
D.

Proposed Legislation

Liegislation to extend protection of the law to abstract ideas has been
seriously considered. It is argued that inventors and authors of embryonic
productions are not sufficiently protected by existing law, in that often
during the progress of their original thoughts from conception to a concrete form, they are deprived of the fruits of their labor by others appropriating the ideas to their own use and development. With this in mind,
Senator King in 1929 introduced a resolution in the Senate authorizing
the Committee on Patents to study the advisability of legislation protecting ideas.5 2

51.

Even this resolution, however, would require an idea to

Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99, 102-03 (1879):

"To give to the author

of the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and
a fraud upon the public. . . * The very object of publishing a book on
science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge
could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book." See also
Johnson v. Donaldson, 3 Fed. 22, 24 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1880), and Carter v.
Bailey, 64 Me. 458, 461-62 (1874).
52. Senate Resolution No. 101, July 19, 1929, which reads in part as follows:
"Whereas it is contended that statutory protection for property and proprietary rights and ownership in original thoughts, conceptions, and ideas in art,
literature, science, mechanics, and the useful arts is incomplete and that artists, authors, scientists, and inventors are not now satisfactorily protected by
law in their proprietary and property rights and ownership during the progress
of their original ideas and works from conception to reduction to practice, and
from reduction to practice to and through sale for use, and for application and
use of their original conceptions and ideas after reduction to practice or to
tangible form; and
"Whereas it is contended by artists, authors, scientists, and inventors that
property and proprietary rights exist in original ideas or combinations of original ideas, if definitely formulated and forwarded, and in their use or application irrespective of whether they are combined with physical, material, or
tangible means of making practical application of such ideas; and
"Whereas the subject and situation warrant careful investigation and consideration by Congress with a view to defining and protecting property and
proprietary rights in such original thoughts, conceptions, and ideas; Therefore, be it
"RESOLVED, That the Committee on Patents, or any duly authorized
subcommittee thereof, is authorized and directed (1) to investigate the extent to which the rights of persons engaged in art, literature, science, mechanics,
and the useful arts in their original thoughts, conceptions, and ideas leading
to invention and discovery have been and may be considered in law, equity, and
common usage as property and proprietary rights, and the extent to which such
persons have been or may reasonably be protected in the commercial or other
use of such original thoughts, conceptions, and ideas, and (2) to report to

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss3/1
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be definitely formulated and the precise method indicated by which the
thought is to be reduced to practice. It was said that the resolution
sought "to open another, entirely new field for protection of creative
work, this time in the field of mental endeavor, regardless of whether there
is something tangible to show for the idea."" The date set for the Committee's report was April 15, 1930, but no report was ever made and apparently the proposal has long since been forgotten.
II.

PROTECTION OF IDEAs AND THEIR CONCRETE ExPREssIoN

A. Protection of Abstract Ideas by Contract
Although it is clear that ideas in themselves are not property, some
cases indicate that the originator may protect an abstraction by contract.
Thus the New York Court of Appeals has said that if an idea "cannot
be sold or negotiated or used without a disclosure, it would seem proper
,54
that some contract should guard or regulate the disclosure. .
This quotation was recently set out and approved by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.5 5 In both cases, however, these
statements were obiter.
If an idea is not property, how may it constitute consideration to support a binding promise? No case has been found specifically holding in
the affirmative. Suppose that the author of an idea submits it to another
person only on condition that the latter pay for it in the event it is used.
The use of the idea by the latter would ordinarily constitute an acceptance
of the offer, but, because the idea is not property, there can be no con-

the Senate as soon as practicable, but in no event later than April 15, 1930, the
results of its investigation, together with its recommendations for necessary
legislation to protect for a limited time the property and proprietary rights of
such persons in their original thoughts, conceptions, and ideas leading to invention and discovery." (71 CONG. REc. 3090 (1929)).
53. 11 J. PATENT OFFICE Soc. 337 (1929). It was further pointed out
that: "The resolution presents the contention that statutory protection for
property and proprietary rights and ownership in original thoughts, concep-

tions and ideas in art, literature, science, mechanics and the useful arts is at
present insufficient; that such rights exist in original ideas or combinations of
ideas, if definitely formulated and forwarded, and in
whether they are combined with physical or tangible
tical application of them."
54. Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,
506, 507 (1892).
55. Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. (2d)

their use irrespective of
means of making prac-

132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E.
345 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).

A statement to this effect also appears in Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg.
Co., 216 Fed. 401 (C. C. W. D. Mich. 1908). The rule was likewise indicated
in Hughes v. West Pub. Co., 225 Ill. App. 58, 80 N. E. 59 (1922).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
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sideration to support the promise to pay for its use and hence there can
be no contract. 8
An express agreement to pay for an idea to be later disclosed is without
consideration and there is no binding contract even though the idea is in
fact disclosed. In Soule v. Bon Ami Co.,5 suit was brought for the breach
of a contract whereby defendant had agreed to pay plaintiff for a method
of increasing its profits without expense. When disclosed, the idea was
merely to raise prices and the court held that this would not constitute
consideration for the promise to make payment, saying:
any consideration exist for the agreement by
. . .does
defendant to pay plaintiff one-half of its increased profits? The
plaintiff, according to his complaint, was to impart to the defendant valuable information, and this information was to suggest a way or method of increasing the defendant's profits. When
this information was furnished to the defendant, it consisted merely of the suggestion that the defendant should increase its price
upon its product, and thereby an increased profit would result.
"The plaintiff did not prove the contract was supported by
a valuable consideration, and the complaint should have been dismissed." 58
In Masline v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. R., 1' the parties
agreed that defendant would pay plaintiff a percentage of the profits resulting from a plan to be submitted by defendant. The plan consisted of
a mere advertising idea and was held not sufficient consideration to effect
a binding contract, although it had been accepted and used by defendant,
the court stating ° "that it could have no market value so as to form the
consideration for a contract."
Obviously, a different question is presented when the consideration is
not primarily the idea, but the labor involved in producing it. Thus, in
the cases just referred to, had it been necessary for plaintiff to engage
in extensive research before he could be certain of the advisability of
adopting the plan proposed, his labor might be held to constitute good

56. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 28 F. (2d) 529 (S. D. N. Y. 1928), aff'd,
43 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930); Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70, FP.
(2d) 345 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N. Y. 281, 171 N. .
56 (1930), rev'g 216 N. Y. Supp. 829 (1st Dep't 1926).
57. 201 App. Div. 794, 195 N. Y. Supp. 574 (2d Dep't 1922), af4'd, 235
N. Y. 609, 139 N. E. 754 (1923).
58. Id. at 795, 195 N. Y. Supp. at 575.
59. 95 Conn. 702, 112 AtI. 639 (1921).
60. Id. at 707, 112 Atl. at 640.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss3/1
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consideration. This question, however, has not been considered by the
courts in the field under consideration.
B. Protection for Material Embodiment
Where an idea has been reduced to its ultimate form and therefore
has become usable and potentially beneficial, the weight of public policy
compels protection for the author. In such circumstances to deny protection would constitute the first extreme position condemned by Lord
Mansfield, "that men of ability, who have employed their time for the
service of the community . . . be deprived of their just merits and
the reward of their ingenuity and labor." For this reason, the courts have
extended protection to ideas reduced to a concrete form by denominating
them "literary property." The basis for this right was said by Blackstone to lie in the mental effort necessary for its production and the right
of everyone to the fruit of his labor. 61 The right exists entirely apart from
statute 2 and is governed for the most part by the same rules of transfer
Curiously, however, it
and succession as any other personal property.
property
may
not
be
seized and sold on an
has been held that this type of
attachment or execution, but these decisions have been severely and justly
criticised. 64 In order to constitute literary property within the protection
of the common law, the material embodiment of an idea must be concrete,
novel, original and lawful.

61.

2 Bu CoM. *405. See also American Tobacco Co. v. Werekmeister,

207 U. S. 284, 291 (1907); Werckmeister v. American Lith. Co., 134 Fed. 321,
324 (C. C. A. 2d, 1904), rev'g 126 Fed. 244 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1903); 13 C. J.
948.
62. 13 C. J. 947. In England, however, the common law doctrine has
been expressly abrogated by the Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 GEO. V., c. 46, §

31. To the extent that the common law protected the right after publication,

it has been superseded by the Copyright Statutes in the United States. See
Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (U. S. 1834); and Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.
S. 82, 85 (1898). Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 121 S. W. (2d) 282 (Mo. App. 1938),
noted in (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 221, is the only Missouri case. See also Suddoth
v. Bryan, 39 Mo. App. 652 (1890).
63. See cases cited in 13 C. J. 948, n. 35. In Aronson v. Baker, 43 N. J.
Eq. 365, 12 At. 177 (Ch. 1888), it was said: "The right to literary property
is just as sacred, and just as much entitled to the protection of the law, as
the right to any other kind of personal property. Its acquisition and succession are governed by the same legal rules which control the acquisition and
quccession of other property of the same general class, and, if the rights of
its owner are violated, he is entitled to the same remedies to which the owner

of other personal property may resort for redress."
64. See 13 C. J. 950, n. 53, n. 54.
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(1) The work must be concrete
By listing concreteness as the first requirement for the protection on
an idea we perhaps become guilty of a contradiction of terms, for the very
term "idea" negatives concreteness. This, however, has not troubled the
courts, who feel that because of reasons of public policy such ideas should
be protected, and in order to reach that result call them literary property.
It perhaps would be more exact to say that not the idea but its material
embodiment is subject to protection.
It has already been demonstrated that this material cloak of an idea
must be minutely concrete in order to be considered property. All the
details must be developed and their mode of operation indicated. Nothing
must be left to the voluntary action of strangers.
A recent example of an idea sufficiently reduced to a concrete form
so as to constitute literary property is found in Liggett andZ Meyer Tobacco
Co. v. Meyer.6 4a In this case plaintiff had sent defendant a letter offering
to sell it an advertising idea described in the letter as follows: "The idea
consists of this: Two gentlemen, well groomed, in working clothes or in
hunting togs apparently engaged in conversation, one extending to the
other a package of cigarettes, saying, 'Have one of these,' the other replying, 'No thanks; I smoke Chesterfields.' "
It is plain that this suggestion was far more concrete than those already
noted which the courts held were not property. No detail remained to be
worked out; all that was required was to employ an artist to draw the
picture in exact compliance with the suggestion. Suit was brought for
wrongful appropriation of the plan, it being contended that defendant
had used the idea in its advertising without paying for it. The court held
that "While we recognize that an abstract idea as such may not be the
subject of a property right, yet, when it takes upon itself the concrete form
which we find in the instant case, it is our opinion that it then becomes a
property right subject to sale."
Even more apparent is the correctness of the decision by the Wash4
ington Supreme Court in Ryan & Associates v. Century Brewing Ass .6 b
Plaintiff, an advertising agency, was invited to submit to defendant, then
about to begin the manufacture and sale of beer, suggestions for an advertising program. Pursuant to this invitation, plaintiff submitted a slogan

64a. 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N. E. 206, 210 (1935).
64b. 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. (2d) 1053 (1936).
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entitled "The Beer of the Century." Plaintiff knew that other advertising
agencies had likewise submitted suggestions and that each desired to obtain the regular employment of defendant in devising and handling its
advertising campaign. Plaintiff was not so employed, but nevertheless
defendant began to use plaintiff's slogan. The jury awarded plaintiff a
substantial verdict for its services in conceiving the slogan, and on appeal
the Supreme Court held that while an abstract idea was not property,
yet the facts presented an idea in a concrete form susceptible of private
ownership, relying on Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, and saying:
"So far as the appellant is concerned, we see no difference
between a suit such as this for services rendered and a suit based
upon the originator's property right in his own idea.
"The value of the property right or the value of the services
each depend upon the value of the idea to the user and evidence
as to the extent of the use and the volume of sales would be admissible in either case. Again, the respondent being the originator
of the idea, and it being a novel one in which it had a property
right, and the disclosure being to the appellant alone and being
strictly limited and coupled with a warning that a violation of its
property right therein would subject the violator to liability, there
was no such disclosure as would, under the law, destroy respondent's property right in its idea. If it were held otherwise,
the mere offer to sell would destroy the thing offered."
In Thompson v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp.,64 C it was held that a
scenario and synopsis for a photoplay constituted property for the reason
that the ideas therein used were put in a concrete form. The court said:
"On both English, state, and federal authority it is established that the
products of intellectual labor, when brought to a concrete, finished form,
and not dedicated by publication to common use, are at common law private
property, and to be protected as such."
The court pointed out that although the scenario was not written
to be directly presented to the public, yet the sentences contained in it were
to be put upon the screen and the remainder constituted stage directions
to the actors. Therefore, it closely resembled a written drama and was
analogous to architects' plans.
There are many ways in which an idea may be put into a concrete

64c. 3 F. (2d) 707 (N. D. Ga. 1925).
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painting,67 etching,"8

73
2
map,74
letter, architectural drawing,71 lecture, book
photograph,
77
7
slogan,75 news article 6 or scenario.
(2) There must be both novel ty and originality
Literary property is both novel and original. The work must be novel
in that it is new to the world, and it must be originated by him who claims
it or by his assignor. Thus, there was no right in the suggestion that prices
be raised in order to increase profits, for "it cannot be claimed that the
plaintiff had any monopoly of the idea that an increase in price would result
69

7

65. Aronson v. Fleckenstein. 28 Fed. 75 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1886); Maxwell v.
Goodwin, 93 Fed. 665 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1899); Uproar Co. v. Nat. Broadcasting
Co., 81 F. (2d) 373 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936); Shook v. Rankin, 21 Fed. Cas. Not
12804 (C. C. N. D. Minn. 1875); Aronson v. Baker, 43 N. J. Eq. 365, 12 Atl.
177 (Ch. 1888); Palmer v. Dewitt, 47 N. Y. 532 (1872); Fleron v. Lackaye, 14
N. Y. Supp. 292 (N. Y. City Super. Ct. 1891); Toole v. Young, L. R. 9 Q.
B. 523 (1873).
66. Thomas v. Lennon, 14 Fed. 849 (C. C. D. Mass. 1883); Corte v.
Ford, 15 Fed. 439 (C. C. D. Md. 1883); Mikado Case, 25 Fed. 183 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1885); Wilkie v. Santly Bros., Inc., 91 F. (2d) 978 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937);
Stern v. Carl Laemmle Music Co., 74 Misc. 262, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1082 (Sup.
Ct. 1911); Casino Productions, Inc. v. Vitaphone Corp., 163 Misc. 403, 295 N.
Y. Supp. 501 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
67. American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284 (1907); Werckmeister v. Springer Lith. Co., 63 Fed. 808 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1894); Caliga
v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 157 Fed. 186 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907), aff'd, 216
U. S. 182 (1909); Parton v. Prang, 18 Fed. Cas. No. 10,784 (C. C. D. Mass.
972); Oertel v. Wood, 40 How. Pr. 10 (N. Y. 1870); Mansell v. Valley Printing Co., [1908] 2 Ch. 441; Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. R. 121 (1860).
68. Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeG. & S. 652 (Ch. 1848).
69. Bowden Bros. v. Amalgamated Pictorials, [19111 1 Ch. 386.
70. Grigsby v. Breckenridge, 1 Bush 480 (Ky. 1867); Denis v. Leclerc,
I Mart. 159. (La. 1811); Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N. E. 109 (1912);
Woolsey v. Judd, 11 N. Y. Super. 379, 11 How. Pr. 49 (1855); Barrett v. Fish,
72 Vt. 18, 47 Atl. 174 (1899).
71. Wright v. Eisle, 86 App. Div. 356, 83 N. Y. Supp. 887 (2d Dep't

1903).

72.

McDearmott Comm. Co. v. Chicago Board of Trade, 146 Fed. 961

(C. C. A. 8th, 1906) ; Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray 545 (Mass. 1860) ; N. J. State
Dental Soc. v. Dentacura Co., 57 N. J. Eq. 593, 41 Atl. 672 (Ch. 1898); Abernathy v. Hutchinson, 1 Hall & T. 28 (Ch. 1825).
73. Dart v. Woodhouse, 40 Mich. 399 (1879); Banker v. Caldwell, 3 Minn.
94 (1859); Watson v. Cowdrey, 23 Hun 169 (N. Y. 1880); Berry v. Hoffman,
125 Pa. Super. 261, 189 Atl. 516 (1937); Vernon Abstract Co. v. Waggoner
Title Co., 49 Tex. Civ. App. 144, 107 S. W. 919 (1908).
475 (1874).
74. Rees v. Peltzer, 75 Ill.
75. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.
E. 206 (1935); Healey v. R. H. Macey & Co., 251 App. Div. 440, 297 N. Y.
Supp. 165 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Ryan v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600,
55 P. (2d) 1053 (1936).
76. Jenkins v. News Syndicate Co., 128 Misc. 284, 219 N. Y. Supp. 196
(Sup. Ct. 1926).
77. Thompson v. Famous Players Lasky Corp., 3 F. (2d) 707 (N. D. Ga.
1925); and Brown v. Ferris, 122 Misc. 418, 204 N. Y. Supp. 190 (N. Y. City
Mun. Ct. 1924).
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in an increase of profits.' " The suggestion that a railroad sell advertising
space in its stations, cars or right of ways, was not property because "the
idea was not new nor exclusively within the plaintiff's knowledge, but was
perfectly obvious and well known to all men." 79 A system of finance was
not property because "the scheme was not original but was an old one
which had been in operation in Europe for many years.' '8 A plan for
selling cars through weekly deposits in banks was held "not a new idea. "81
Property rights were denied to the author of a suggestion as to the
construction of a motor car for the reason that it was not original with
the alleged author, the court saying:
"But it must be the plaintiff's idea. Upon communication to
the defendant it at once did appear that the idea was not original
with the plaintiff, but was a matter of common knowledge, well
known to the world at large."'82
With respect to the question of originality, an interesting question
arises as to property rights of an artist in the performance of a musical
composition composed by another. He clearly has no rights in the composition itself because he cannot claim authorship, but he may claim originality
in the manner in which he has rendered its performance. May a radio
station broadcast the phonograph recording of his performance? -Only one
case has arisen in which this problem was considered, Waring V. WDAS
Broadcasting Station, Inc.,83 decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. There, plaintiff was conductor of an orchestra which had been
incorporated under the laws of New York and had achieved a world wide
reputation. The orchestra had made phonograph recordings for the Victor
Talking Machine Company which had been duly licensed by the copyright

78. Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 201 App. Div. 794, 195 N. Y. Supp. 574, 576
(2d Dep't 1922), aff'4, 235 N. Y. 609, 139 N. E. 754 (1923). The court said
further: "No person can by contract monopolize an idea that is common and
general to the whole world."
79. Masline v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 95 Conn. 702, 11 Atl. 639
(1921).
80.

Stein v. Morris, 120 Va. 390, 91 S.E. 177 (1917).

81.

Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 28 F. (2d) 529, 537 (S.D. N. Y. 1928).

See also Universal

Savings Corp. v. Morris Plan Co. of N. Y., 234 Fed. 382 (S.D. N. Y. 1916).

82. Leuddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. (2d) 345, 348 (C. C. A. 8th,
1934). See also, Victor Talking Machine Co. v. George, 69 F. (2d) 871, 875
(C. C. A. 3d, 1934); Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App.
420, 194 N. E. 206, 210 (1935); Stern v. Carl Laemmle Music Co., 74 Misc. 262,

133 N. Y. Supp. 1082 (Sup. Ct. 1911); and Ryan and Associates v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. (2d) 1053 (1936).
83. 327 Pa. 433, 194 Atl. 631 (1937). This question was involved but not
decided in April Productions, Inc. v. Harms, Inc., 165 Misc. 883, 1 N. Y. Supp.
(2d) 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
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owners. Plaintiff had inserted the following notation on each record: "Not
licensed for radio broadcasting." Defendant was a commercial broadcasting
station and reproduced the recordings after having procured a license
from the copyright owners. Plaintiff sought an injunction to protect
his common law rights in the manner in which he had performed the
composition. The court frankly admitted that the problem had never been
raised in an English or American case.
It was strongly contended that a musical artist does not produce anything novel or original merely by playing a composition, but merely renders
articulate the silent composition of the author. In meeting this contention
the court, however, pointed out that "it must be clear that such actors, for
example, as David Garrick, Mrs. Siddons, Rachel, Booth, Coquelin, Sarah
Bernhardt and Sir Henry Irving, or such vocal and instrumental artists
as Jenny Lind, Melba, Caruso, Paderewski, Kreisler and Toscanini, by
their interpretations, definitely added something to the work of authors
and composers which not only gained for themselves enduring fame but
enabled them to enjoy financial rewards from the public in recognition
of their unique genius. . . ."I"
The court thereupon reviewed many cases holding that operatic arrangements, news reports of observations, translations, and other types of
revisions and arrangements were literary property. These, the court held,
were analagous to the recorded performance of a musical composition,
saying:
"A musical composition in itself is an incomplete work; the
written page evidences only one of the creative acts which are
necessary for its enjoyment; it is the performer who must consummate the work by transforming it into sound. . . . All that
need now be decided is that such a property right inheres in the
case of those artists who elevate interpretations to the realm of independent works of art.'' 85

84. Id. at 440, 194 Atl. at 635.
85. The court also said that the decision might be based on the law of
unfair competition, but Justice Maxey, in a separate concurring opinion, rejected this application of unfair competition and based his decision on a breach
of privacy. Another interesting problem arises when the owner of a radio
receiving set picks up an unauthorized broadcast; is he liable? The affirmative
Brewery
was held in Performing Right Society, Ltd. v. Hammonds' Bradford
Co., Ltd., [1934] 1 Ch. 121. See also Chaplin v. Amador, 16 T. M. Rep. 21
(Cal. 1925), in which defendant was enjoined from exporting a motion picture in which Charles Chaplin's methods and mannerisms were imitated.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss3/1
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(3) The work must be moral and lawful
A work which is immoral and contrary to law cannot be literary
property. An immoral play, book or song will be accorded no protection
by the courts even though copyrighted.86 Dissemination of market quotations was not prohibited where it was shown that 90% of the sales executed
87
in the pits of the board of trade were gambling transactions.
C. Protection of ideas to prevent unfair competition
Although abstract ideas are not property, their appropriations may
constitute unfair competition. Mr. Harry Nims, who is the outstanding
authority in this field, says:
"Frequently there are designs, ideas and methods more or
less original in character which are not patentable, but which have
a distinct commercial value. Often the originator expends time
and money in their development, only to find, when they are in
successful operation, that a competitor has appropriated them
bodily, and is using them to sell his own goods. 8Within narrow
limits, acts of this character have been enjoined."
Conceivably, an idea may constitute a trade secret. Suppose a manufacturer's laboratory staff is engaged in developing an idea for a new
machine, and before the idea has assumed a concrete form, a competitor,
by means of bribery, obtains information concerning the idea from the
former's employee, and proceeds to make use of it. Could it successfully
be contended that the competitor was not guilty of unfair competition?
In Meyer v. Hurwitz, 9 complainant was a manufacturer of picture
post cards representing stage and athletic celebrities, and had designed
an automatic vending machine to dispense the cards. Defendant manufactured similar cards and sold them for use in machines designed and
manufactured by complainant. In a suit for injunction the court held

86. Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 Fed. 74 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1898).
87. Chicago Board of Trade v. Donovan Comm. Co., 121 Fed. 1012 (C. C.

E. D. Mo. 1903), rev'd on other grounds, 145 Fed. 28, 31 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906);

Chicago Board of Trade v. Kinsey Co., 125 Fed. 72 (C. C. D. Ind. 1903), rev'd
on other grounds, 130 Fed. 507 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904), 198 U. S. 236 (1905).
88. Nims, UNFAIR COMPErION AND TRADE-MARKs (3d ed. 1929) § 289.

See also 63 C. J. 466, wherein it is stated: "Although it has been said that

there is apparently no authority holding that at common law there is a proprietary right in a system, device, plan, or scheme and injunctive relief has been
refused where no competition or damage was shown, yet, where a person established a business system peculiarly his own, another has been guilty of unfair competition in attempting to appropriate such business system and substitute his goods for those of the originator of the system."

89. 5 F. (2d) 370 (E. D. Pa. 1925), aff'd, 10 F. (2d) 1019 (C. C. A.
3d, 1926). See also Meccano v. Wagner, 234 Fed. 912 (S. D. Ohio 1916), decree modified, 246 Fed. 603 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 3 [1939], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

that complainant had no right to prevent defendant from copying his cards
after they had been published nor could defendant be restrained from
entering the same business as complainant, but nevertheless granted an
injunction on the ground of unfair competition, saying:
"But after the plaintiff has, through years of effort and expenditure, built up a system and organized a business, the defendant may not, by associating therewith a right which is not denied
him, that of imitating the plaintiff's uncopyrighted cards, appropriate to himself the plaintiff's system or organization for the
purpose of underselling him and appropriating to himself profits
to which the plaintiff through his efforts, expenditures, and industry is entitled. ' '0
To hold that wrongful appropriation of an idea may constitute unfair competition does not necessarily presuppose a general property right
in the idea. Ideas are not property in themselves, but if the parties are
competitors, ideas may give rise to duties and obligations when their
misuse constitutes an unfair trade practice. Unfair competition does not
presuppose an absolute property right in the specific article appropriated.
This was made clear by the United States Supreme Court in Internationa
News Service v. Associated Press,9 1 in which it was sought to enjoin defendant from copying complainant's uncopyrighted news article from
bulletin boards and early editions of newspapers in the East and selling
them, either bodily or after re-writing, to its own customers for re-publication in other sections of the country. Complainant contended that this
conduct violated its property right in the news articles as well as constituted unfair competition. Clearly, there was no common law of property in the articles after they had been published, but the court said that
a consideration of the question was unnecessary as their appropriation by
a defendant constituted unfair competition which "does not depend upon
any general right of property analogous to the common-law right of the
proprietor of an unpublished work to prevent its publication without his
consent; nor is it foreclosed by showing that the benefits of the copyright
92
act have been waived."
In holding that the defendant was guilty of unfair competition, Mr.

90. Meyer v. Hurwitz, 5 F. (2d) 370, 371 (E. D. Pa. 1925).
91. 248 U. S. 215 (1918). See also Affiliated Enterprises, Inc., v. Truber,
86 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936); and Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W. D. Pa. 1938).
92. 248 U. S. 215, 235 (1918).
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Justice Pitney said that "The parties are competitors in this field; and,
on fundamental principles, applicable here as elsewhere, when the rights
or privileges of the one are liable to conflict with those of the other, each
party is under a duty so to conduct its own business as not unnecessarily
or unfairly to injure that of the other.' 93
The court pointed out that although there was no property right
of either party in the articles as against the public, yet complainant had
a "quasi property" as to defendant, and hence defendant would not in
equity be heard to complain that this right was "too fugitive or evanescent
to be the subject of property," for it had "all the attributes of property
necessary for determining that a misappropriation of it by a competitor
is unfair competition because contrary to good conscience. "4
The courts have not always followed the rule suggested by the cases
thus far noted in this connection, as they are reluctant to grant protection
of any kind to ideas. Thus, in the recent case of Affiliated Enterprises,
Inc., v. Gruber,95 an attempt was made t.o enjoin a competitor from using
and selling to theaters a bank night plan originated by complainant. It
was contended that such misuse by defendant constituted unfair competition. As only the idea had been copied, the court held that there was no
infringement of complainant's copyright, the idea itself not constituting
property at common lawY6 Meyer v. Hurwitz,96 a was distinguished by the
court saying that it involved the taking of a business consisting of manufacturing and selling post cards. But was not an entire business system
appropriated in both cases, and can it make any difference that the system
consisted of selling post cards or a bank night plan?
There was, however, a factual distinction with respect to the International News Service case, for there it may be said that while the news had
been published in the East, yet it still remained unpublished in other
localities, at least as between the parties competing in that field. This
distinction was not made, however, by the court of appeals, which, instead, attempted to base a distinction on the ground that the International

93.

Id. at 235.

94. Id. at 240.
95. 86 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936).
96. Id. at 961: "However good and valuable an idea, plan, scheme or
system is, the moment it is disclosed to the public without the protection of
a patent, it becomes public property, and the fact that it has been made popular
by advertising and the expenditure of effort, time, and money on the part of
the originator does not alter the situation."
96a. 5 F. (2d) 370, 371 (E. D. Pa. 1925).
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News Service case involved an appropriation not of a system for doing
business but the concrete result of labor and skill, the value of which had
not yet been wiped out by publication. Such a distinction would not permit publication of a literary work to alter the common law rights of the
author until the monetary value is thereby erased. However, the value
of a literary work to the author is seldom reduced by publication until by
reason thereof other persons make use of it. Hence, the court evaded the
issue.
The case of Uaronson v. Orlov 97 was a suit to enjoin complainant's
former employee from disclosing and using an idea for manufacturing
petticoats with elastic seams, which idea was claimed to be a trade secret.
In granting relief the court was careful to point out that the idea had been
developed into a concrete form, saying that "The idea of the improvement
. .
was not a mere nebulous phantom of the fancy, but a
definite conception of a material device so simple that its mere statement
would convey as clear a notion as would a model of a complicated mech-

anism."' 9 8

99
In Hughes v. West Publishing Co.,
the complaint charged a wrongful
appropriation of a key number system idea designed by plaintiff in connection with law books. As only the general idea had been copied there
was no infringement of plaintiff's literary property and the court held
that there could be no unfair competition if the parties were not competitors, thereby expressly distinguishing the case from InternationalNews
Service v. Associated Press9 a The case indicated, however, that had the
parties been competitors, relief might have been granted.
Thus it is clear that there may be property rights as between competitors in things to which no rights would attach as against the general
public. This leads to the conclusion that the appropriation of ideas may
in some instances constitute unfair competition.

III. INFRINGEMENT OF LITERARY PROPERTY
The owner of literary property has many of the same rights as the
owner of the copyright, except that they are lost by the first general

97.
98.
99.
99a.

228 Mass. 1, 116 N. E. 951 (1917).
Id. at 4, 116 N. E. at 952.
225 ll. App. 58 (1922).
248 U. S. 215 (1918).
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publication. 00 If he chooses, he may keep his product private and forever
unpublished and, therefore, may impose such conditions as he chooses on
the first publication. The common law will protect him against the unauthorized appropriation by which another copies or uses the material
embodiment of his work.
It has already been shown that an idea is not property. It therefore
follows that the appropriation of an idea taken from a literary work in
concrete form is not an infringement of the owner's rights at common
law or by statute. 101 In order to be an infringer, one must appropriate the
concrete form itself. Thus in Haski'ns v. Ryan, 0 2 although the plan was
expressed in writing and the court held that the author had a property
right in the manuscript, the appropriation of the mere idea expressed in
the plan of combining the white lead industries did not constitute an
infringement of plaintiff's rights. The New Jersey court there said that
"The combination of words of which it is composed (whether written
down, or acted or sung before an audience admitted on payment of a
fee) is also protected, and publication is restrained even if the manuscript be destroyed and an attempt be made to reproduce it from a copy
rightfully in the possession of another, or even from memory."' ' 0
The New York Court of Appeals in Fencdier v. Morosco,104 held that
there would be no infringement in copying merely the theme and color
of plaintiff's play, the court saying that in an embryonic state the material in the two plays under consideration was the same, because both of

100.

This rule arose apparently after the enactment of the copyright law.

NIms, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS (3d ed. 1929) § 273. A general publication should be distinguished from a limited publication, which does

not forfeit the author's rights. Publication of news articles in one section of
the country is not an abandonment of rights in other localities. International
News Service v. Assoc. Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918). A promiscuous sale of
copies of a manuscript constitutes general publication. Wagner v. Conried,
125 Fed. 798 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1903); 13 C. J. 980-992.

The publication of a

picture on postcards is a dedication to the public. Meyer v. Hurwitz, 5 F. (2d)
370 (E. D. Pa. 1925). Rendering of work over radio is not an abandonment of
ownership. Uproar Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D.
Mass. 1934), modified in 81 F. (2d) 373 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936), cert. denied, 298
U. S. 670 (1936).

A dramatic presentation for hire is not a general publica-

tion. Brown v. Ferris, 122 Misc. 418, 204 N. Y. Supp. 190 (N. Y. City Mun.
Ct. 1924). Confidential disclosure is not a general publication. Dodge Corp.
v. Comstock, 140 Misc. 105, 251 N. Y. Supp. 172 (Sup. Ct. 1931).

Opening

a house to the public constitutes unrestricted publication of architect's plans
pursuant to which the house was built. Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 121 S. W. (2d)
282 (Mo. App. 1938), noted in (1939) 4 Mo. L. Rxv. 221.
101. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F. (2d) 685, 688 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
102. 71 N. J. Eq. 575, 64 AtI. 436 (Ch. 1906).
103. Id. at 578, 64 Atl. at 437.
104. 253 N. Y. 281, 171 N. E. 56 (1930).
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them presented the life and customs of the same tropical islands, but that
the material itself had been changed in form and used in entirely different
combinations.
0
plaintiff complained of defendant's appropria.
In Burnell v. Chown,"'
tion of a scheme to compile data as to the financial standing of business
men. The court said that defendant had adopted plaintiff's general plan
for gathering and imparting the information, but this alone was not an
infringement for, although the framework and outlines of the books were
the same, the second was just as much the product of literary knowledge
and literary ability as the former.
In Maxwell v. Goodwin,'"0 plaintiff's drama was alleged to have been
infringed by one written by defendant. The court approved an instruction "that, unless identity was found in the manner and expression showing that one was copied from the other substantially and in material parts,
although not in the exact language or form, there was no piracy, and the
defendant was not liable in this action."
Any substantial reproduction of the material embodiment of any
literary work apart from the ideas themselves constitutes an infringement.
This includes copying in shorthand,' 07 photographinge0 8 or even a reproduction from memory.0 9 '
The courts have not hesitated to grant injunctive relief for violation
of rights in literary property." 0 An accounting of profits" has sometimes
been given to the injured party in injunctive relief. Suit may be brought
for conversion, 1 2 or on an implied contract for the reasonable value of the
1
property taken" 3 or for services rendered in producing the property."

105.

106.

69 Fed. 993 (C. C. N. D. Ohio 1895).

93 Fed. 665 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1899).

107. Nichols v. Pitman, 26 Ch. D. 374 (1884).
108. Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir. Ch. R. 121, 510 (1860).
109.

Werckmeister v. American Lith. Co., 134 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 2d, 1904),

and cases cited in 13 C. J. 990, n. 61.
110. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424 (1912); Goldmark v. Kreling, 25 Fed.
349 (C. C. D. Cal. 1885), 35 Fed. 661 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1888).

111.

French v. Kreling, 63 Fed. 621 (C. C. N. D. Cal, 1894); Maurel v.

Smith, 220 Fed. 195 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).

112. Boucicault v. Wood, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1693 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1867); Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 575, 64 Atl. 436 (Ch. 1906).
113. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420. 194 N. E.

206 (1935); Taft v. Smith, Gray & Co., 76 Misc. 283, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1011
(Sup. Ct. 1912).
114. Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 52 Hun 161, 5 N. Y. Supp.
131 (Sup. Ct. 1889); Ryan v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600, 55 P.

(2d) 1053 (1936).
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In determining the value of an advertising scheme, consideration is given
to the amount of money defendant expended in using the seheme, the
extent to which it was used by defendant and to any custom of the advertising business with regard to the compensation usually paid for such
property.115 In addition to the remedies already mentioned it is held that
where property is in a manuscript form replevin will lie.116
IV.

CoNCLusIoN

For reasons of public policy, the courts have refused to extend protection at common law to abstract ideas and by various devices they have
reached the conclusion that ideas are not property and therefore not subject to protection. On the contrary, when the ideas have been put into
a concrete form, public policy compels protection for the concrete form to
which the ideas have been reduced. The material embodiment of an idea
in order to constitute property at common law must be concrete, novel,
original and lawful. Any unauthorized use of such property before general publication constitutes an infringement, and the unauthorized use of
an idea itself in some instances constitutes unfair competition.

115. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.
E. 206 (1935).
116. 13 C. J. 991.
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